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On the Brink of a New Arms Race
In December 2018, Russia attested a new weapon sys-
tem: a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle named 
Avangard, which President Putin described as a “wonder-
ful, perfect New Year’s gift for the country.”1 This test was 
only the latest step in a dynamic harboring serious char-
acteristics of an arms race; a situation where two or more 
actors are developing specific weapons with reference 
to developments of the other. Besides Russia, China is 
working on its own hypersonic glide vehicle called WU-14, 
which is scheduled to begin operations in 2020. The USA 
has conducted and is currently conducting tests with both 
hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missile capable of fly-
ing at hypersonic speeds. All three countries defend their 
research, development and testing activities for these 
weapon systems as necessary to outperform the military 
capabilities of potential adversaries. For Russia and China, 
this adversary is the USA – and vice versa.
Technology and Strategic Consequences
Hypersonic flight refers to flight speeds around or above 
Mach 5 (5.500 km/h) and up to about Mach 20 (up to 
22.000 km/h). Currently, three main types of weapon 
systems are in development which are envisioned to 
reach hypersonic speed: hypersonic aircraft, hypersonic 
cruise missiles (HCMs) and hypersonic glide vehicles 
(HGVs). Hypersonic aircraft and HCMs are essentially 
advancements of current systems. HGVs are unpowered 
gliders which are brought to the necessary heights by con-
ventional ballistic missiles and then descend upon their 
target with significantly higher maneuverability than ex-
isting re-entry vehicles. Compared to their predecessors 
and similar systems, the fast cruising speed will make all 
three types more survivable against air defense systems.
Three main effects of hypersonic weapon systems 
stand out: First, their ability to engage targets even if 
they are covered by sophisticated air defenses at a time 
when such air defense systems are proliferating globally. 
Second, they have the potential to further enhance the 
range and capabilities of Anti-Access/Access-Denial (A2/
AD) weapon systems. However, it is the third effect which 
entails the most challenging consequences in a strate-
gic sense: Hypersonic weapon systems could be used to 
conduct decapitation strikes or first-strikes on strategic 
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weapons, especially nuclear arms. This would endanger 
the delicate equilibrium between the nuclear powers that 
evolved with the conception of second-strike capabilities 
and doctrines such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
Abundant Technological Challenges
As with most technologies still maturing, both technologi-
cal challenges and failure rates in flight tests are quite high. 
Currently, no hypersonic weapon system or commercial 
application has completed the experimentation phase. The 
earliest introductions into operational service are planned 
by China and Russia with their HGVs in 2020. Timelines 
for the future military use of other systems range from ten 
years for HCMs to 20-25 years for hypersonic aircraft. 
Four main technical challenges characterize hyperson-
ic flight: The intense heat occurring at hypersonic speeds 
cause the physical deformation of components, influenc-
ing flight characteristics and maneuverability. Moreover, 
high temperatures cause the ionization of the air which 
envelops part of the object. This impedes flight control 
and renders communication with the aircraft or missile 
highly difficult. With regard to propulsion, in the case of 
aircraft and HCMs, the main technical challenge is to in-
tegrate engine characteristics capable of slower flight for 
start and landing with those needed for hypersonic flight. 
Lastly, current testing facilities and computer simulations 
cannot perfectly simulate the operational environment 
of objects flying at hypersonic speeds. Hence, real flight 
tests are necessary for further development, which sig-
nificantly increases costs and technical requirements. 
Innovation does not only have to come from military 
research: Many results of ongoing state-funded civilian 
research and commercial efforts into hypersonic tech-
nologies will have a dual use. They can also be used to 
develop or improve hypersonic weapon systems, since the 
main problems with hypersonic flight today stem from 
fundamental technologies such as propulsion and materi-
als rather than weapon-specific parts.
Widespread Interest in Technology Makes  
Proliferation Likely
Currently, the USA, Russia and China are on the forefront 
of the development of hypersonic weapon systems, with 
France following with some distance. Additionally, the 
European Union and Japan are very active in civilian 
research and development activities related to hypersonic 
technologies such as hypersonic passenger aircraft in the 
future. Lastly, commercial companies are interested ac-
tors, with some of the most ambitious projects for future 
hypersonic aircraft located in the United Kingdom. All 
these activities highlight widespread interest in the tech-
nology and, for some actors, in their military application, 
which makes future proliferation of hypersonic weapon 
systems more likely.
The three major players in the development of hyper-
sonic technologies demonstrate different stages of matu-
rity for hypersonic weapon systems: While the USA are in 
the lead and are developing all three types of hypersonic 
weapon systems, Russia and China appear to be focus-
ing on the development of HCMs and HGVs, respectively. 
This divergence stems from the different capability levels 
of the domestic aerospace industries where the USA has 
a free hand to explore all options given its sophisticated 
industrial base and access to the most resources. An 
experienced – albeit ultimately constrained – industry al-
lows Russia to focus on the difficult development of HCMs 
and HGVs, while China as an industrial “newcomer” eyes 
the operational use of the least sophisticated hypersonic 
weapon system (HGVs).
Strategic Implications
Introducing hypersonic weapon systems into active 
service in one or more states will alter the global strategic 
landscape. Four changes are likely to occur: compressed 
reaction times, increased deterrence effect, increasing 
ambiguities of military actions, and lastly, second-order 
effects such as the further proliferation of hypersonic 
weapon systems and the weaponization of space. Each of 
these factors will invariably decrease strategic stability 
between states, regardless of whether or not they field 
hypersonic weapon systems themselves.
Time Compression Decreases Stability
The higher speed and lower visibility of hypersonic 
weapon systems compared to their predecessors cause the 
most apparent change in the strategic landscape. Cur-
rent lead times for attacks with ballistic missiles range 
between twenty and thirty minutes (e.g. for an attack by 
Russia on the US) and thus provide military and civil-
ian authorities with a window of opportunity to decide 
within that timeframe. Hypersonic weapons will shrink 
that timeframe considerably to as few as five minutes. 
Even this very short timeframe would only apply if there 
are long distances involved (for instance, Russia to the 
USA instead of Pakistan to India) and when the attacked 
country has quite sophisticated early warning systems in 
place, especially space-based early warning systems. If 
this is not the case, timelines for detection, decision-mak-
ing and reaction shrink even further.
To – at least marginally – compensate for this loss in 
decision-making time, actors will have to employ faster 
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intelligence-gathering and decision-making, potentially 
by automatizing and autonomatizing parts of these pro-
cesses. The pressure on decision makers who determine 
whether or not to launch a retaliatory strike will increase 
exponentially.
Consequently, in many states, time compression might 
lead to force postures aimed at ensuring a second-strike 
by launching retaliatory strikes on warning. This would 
allow that a retaliation strike can be conducted before the 
incoming hypersonic weapons destroy or seriously reduce 
the overall second-strike capability. Since early-warning 
systems are error-prone and might issue warnings due to 
technical errors, launch-on-warning force postures signifi-
cantly increase the risk for escalation and thus war. They 
reduce both strategic and crisis stability between states. 
Putting Forces at Higher Risk
Since hypersonic weapon systems are more capable than 
comparable current systems, they will put military forces 
at higher risk for an attack – especially as no actor today 
has an effective defense against such fast-moving mis-
siles and aircraft. Their introduction thus incentivizes the 
dispersion of forces to reduce losses should an attack oc-
cur. This complicates verification and inspections; in the 
framework of arms control regimes, for example. 
Moreover, hypersonic weapons will also influence the 
survivability of conventional forces: Anti-ship missiles 
based on hypersonic designs might enhance the lethality 
and size of A2/AD zones. Moreover, forward deployed 
forces in Forward Operational Bases (FOBs) that seldom 
have sophisticated air defenses are at greater risks.
Increasing Ambiguities Favor Worst-Case Thinking
Lastly, hypersonic weapon systems and especially HGVs 
aggravate several ambiguities which might lead to 
miscalculations on the side of an adversary. This is due 
to their use of ballistic missiles for launch and in-flight 
maneuverability.
Warhead ambiguity describes the uncertainty about 
whether an incoming missile or HGV is armed with a 
conventional or nuclear warhead. 
Destination ambiguity signifies that the destination 
(in this case, country) of hypersonic weapons is unknown 
– compared to current ballistic missiles which largely fol-
low a physically determined flight path. Such a flight path 
allows for early calculations, while HGVs can maneuver 
and thus change their destination in flight. 
Target ambiguities become relevant when the destina-
tion is largely determined, but the question remains what 
kind of target is to be attacked. For instance, if nuclear 
second-strike capabilities are targeted, this might incentiv-
ize the attacked actor to launch these weapons for a retalia-
tory strike, even if it is not certain that the incoming strike 
is directed towards these second-strike weapons.
Such ambiguities about warheads, destinations and 
targets likely lead attacked actors to assume the worst, 
especially when it comes to their second-strike capabili-
ties. These capabilities are prime targets for any incom-
ing strike and the only viable tools for the attacked actor 
to retaliate sufficiently. Consequently, decision-makers 
will have to make fast decisions for or against retaliation 
strikes since capabilities such as nuclear weapons are 
“use it or lose it” weapons. 
Triggering Proliferation and  
the Weaponization of Space
A widespread introduction of hypersonic weapon systems 
into service could also have the second-order effects 
in that more countries strive to possess such weapon 
systems – which cannot be in the interest of countries 
aiming to increase global strategic stability. Moreover, 
all countries, whether or not they possess hypersonic 
weapons themselves, would be incentivized to disperse 
and decentralize their forces, command, and control net-
works. In all likelihood, even more efforts will be poured 
into advanced air defense systems, which might lead to 
their further proliferation. More countries would seek to 
establish space-based early warning systems capable of 
detecting missile starts as early as possible to maximize 
lead time. Lastly, as US President Trump announced in 
January 2019, even space-based missile defense systems 
might make a comeback.2 In so doing, he opened a Pan-
dora’s box for the weaponization of space.
An Array of Options
Arms control instruments, non-proliferation treaties, 
confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) and 
the build-up of advanced defense systems are the primary 
options for Germany and Europe to react to the emerging 
hypersonic weapon systems. Most existing structures in 
these categories are insufficient for hypersonic weapon 
systems and require adaptation or the introduction of 
new structures. This is especially true when it comes to 
the actors: China is not part of any of the major regimes 
capable of reigning in hypersonic weapon systems and 
their proliferation.
Increasing Stability through Arms Control
Current arms control regimes could partially cover 
emerging hypersonic weapon systems once introduced 
into service. However, they do so only to an insufficient 
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degree, indirectly, within constrained geographical 
areas, and only for certain actors. Furthermore, some 
of these regimes, especially the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Intermedi-
ate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty are facing irrel-
evance or looming obsolescence. Even the future of the 
New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) is unclear, 
which regulates the arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons 
and their delivery systems between Russia and the USA 
and which is scheduled to expire in 2021.
Hypersonic aircraft used for military purposes (ex-
cept for training) could be regulated by the CFE Treaty, 
Article II, section K. At the same time, the CFE Treaty is 
only of limited use in this particular case. This is because 
although hypersonic aircrafts could be stationed well 
outside of Europe, they could still engage targets in Eu-
ropean theaters as they will likely feature long-range and 
high speed. Hence, they would not count as assets under 
CFE regulations. Even if some states were to decide to sta-
tion them within the area of application of the Treaty, no 
participating member state of the CFE Treaty is near the 
ceilings for combat aircraft negotiated under its terms.
At least in the way they have been conceived until now, 
hypersonic cruise missiles are not affected by any exist-
ing arms control regimes. Even though their range and 
profile would make them viable subjects for a ban by the 
INF Treaty, current designs are exclusively air-launched. 
The INF Treaty might be applicable to future hypersonic 
cruise missile systems if they are to be ground-launched. 
However, such systems will probably only emerge in the 
next decade. Given the anticipated termination of the 
INF Treaty this August, it is likely unable to regulate such 
future weapon systems but might serve as an example for 
future arms control treaties.
HGVs would fall under the New START or the INF 
Treaty. Since the former not only covers nuclear warheads 
but also delivery systems and since HGVs are dependent on 
ballistic missiles for their boost-phase, New START directly 
impacts the maximum possible quantities of operational 
HGVs. However, New START only includes weapons if the 
majority of their trajectory has a ballistic character. Hence, 
it will depend on the length of the boost-phase of future 
operational HGVs whether or not they would be covered by 
New START. The United States has even stated that boost-
glide weapons fall outside of the definition of ballistic mis-
siles which would prevent coverage by New START. The 
INF Treaty prevents the use of HGVs in addition to ground-
launched ballistic missiles with intermediate and short 
ranges by banning such systems altogether. However, its 
reach is limited with the USA and Russia as the only treaty 
parties and its likely end later in 2019.
Hence, it is likely that new regimes will have to be 
developed and negotiated to curb the destabilizing effects 
of hypersonic weapon systems. Most importantly, such 
initiatives would have to include countries with limited 
experience in arms control such as China. Unfortunately, 
the current international political environment makes the 
adoption of such new regimes very unlikely.
Hampering Proliferation with Non-Proliferation 
Regimes
Non-proliferation efforts could accompany the develop-
ment of new arms control regimes. Limiting the export 
of hypersonic technologies would be highly effective in 
curbing their proliferation since the technologies are still 
challenging even for the most advanced countries and 
their aerospace industries. Here, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) or the Wassenaar Arrangement 
offer sound bases for either expansion or the conception 
of a new regime. What makes non-proliferation efforts 
difficult is the dissemination of civilian research results 
on hypersonic flight, and adjunct technologies, Moreover, 
both the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement suffer 
from the same main weakness: the limited number of 
participating states, with key countries such as China cur-
rently absent from the arrangements.
Beyond Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Measures beyond rather traditional arms control and non-
proliferation mechanisms can also be used to mitigate the 
effects of hypersonic technologies and weapon systems, 
especially mitigating several of the ambiguities inherent 
Arms Control regime
CFE INF New START
Type of Weapon 
System
Aircraft Partially Not covered Not covered
HCM Not covered Indirect, ground-launched cruise-mis-
siles with short to intermediate range
Not covered
HGV Not covered Indirect, ground-launched ballistic short 
and intermediate missiles
Indirect, ground-launched intercontinental 
ballistic missiles
Table 1: Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Coverage of Hypersonic Weapon Systems by existing regimes
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to these weapon systems. However, all of the following 
require extensive CSBM measures to provide sufficient 
security against potential adversaries: 
1. At the least, HGVs and their respective carrier sys-
tems (ballistic missiles) could be deployed in different 
locations than strategic nuclear weapons in the form 
of ICBMs. This way, an adversary could know that it is 
not a nuclear, but “only” a conventional attack, reduc-
ing warhead ambiguity. Moreover, different carrier 
systems could be used for nuclear warheads than for 
HGVs. 
2. Trajectories of such systems should be different. Such 
measures could decrease warhead ambiguity. 
3. Predictable trajectories and observable midcourse 
trajectories for HGVs and HCMs could decrease 
destination and target ambiguities as well as limit the 
tactical surprise for an attacked country. However, as 
such changes to the technology would also negate its 
most critical military advantages, such a development 
is quite unlikely. 
4. Voluntarily limited deployment of hypersonic weapon 
systems of all kinds might increase crisis stability, 
since no side would have to fear a massive deployment 
of such weapons, potentially engaging and reducing or 
destroying second-strike capabilities. 
5. Countries with active hypersonic weapon systems 
could agree on a voluntary targeting ban, thus ruling 
out the engagement of certain targets (nuclear weap-
ons, for instance) with hypersonic weapon systems. 
However, given that this would significantly diminish 
the return on investment on these weapon systems, 
this is unlikely to be politically feasible. 
6. A test ban for hypersonic weapons similar to the Com-
prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) could be 
utilized to curb further military investments. Given 
the still largely experimental status of hypersonic 
weapon systems, an effective test ban would very likely 
prohibit their actual introduction into active service. 
This is because such an introduction without extensive 
testing would not be in the interest of any armed forces 
which require reliable systems. 
7. It is possible to react by introducing air defenses 
against hypersonic threats. Today, the most advanced 
air defense systems can engage cruise missiles and 
short-to-medium range ballistic missiles. Additionally, 
some states, first and foremost the USA, are working 
on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems to protect 
against long-range ballistic missiles. However, given 
the extreme velocities of hypersonic weapons, the 
technical challenges to intercept such flying objects 
are enormous and would require costly research and 
development programs which would focus on hyper-
sonic missiles as interceptors – or even more technical 
challenging assets such as lasers. 
Focus on the Most Dangerous Weapons 
Germany and Europe have two significant reasons for aim-
ing to curb the destabilizing effects of hypersonic technolo-
gies and weapon systems in particular: First, time compres-
sion and subsequent effects caused by such systems are 
even more dangerous if applied to the European continent, 
in contrast to most intercontinental (transpacific) scenarios 
currently discussed. Second, as Germany and Europe gen-
erally favor stability and de-escalation especially among 
nuclear powers, decreasing strategic and crisis stability 
could never be in their interest.
Time and prioritization are key factors in guiding the 
practical use of limited political and diplomatic resources. 
Since hypersonic weapon systems are in various stages of 
development and have different impacts on strategic bal-
ances and crisis stability, efforts should focus on regulat-
ing HGVs first, then HCMs, and lastly, hypersonic aircraft. 
Given that all these types decrease strategic or crisis 
stability, it is desirable to apply arms control and non-pro-
liferation mechanisms to them. Fortunately, the underly-
ing technologies are still in the experimental state across 
the world, which might reduce the political resistance to 
arms control measures today as opposed to a time when 
these systems are deployed and operationally active.
Torben Schütz is Associate Fellow for the Program Secu-
rity, Defense, and Armaments at the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP).
Hypersonic Weapon Systems Will Decrease Global Strategic Stability – and Current Control Regimes Won’t Do  5
DGAPkompakt  / Nr. 4 / March 2019
Notes
 1 Paul Sonne and Anton Troianovski, “Russia is 
poised to add a new hypersonic nuclear-capable 
glider to its arsenal,” Washington Post , Decem-
ber 26, 2018 <https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/europe/russia-is-poised-to-add-
a-new-hypersonic-nuclear-warhead-to-its-
arsenal/2018/12/26/e9b89374-0934-11e9-8942-
0ef442e59094_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.00417c03ce8d> (accessed on March 11, 
2019).
 2 Lolita C. Baldor and Deb Riechmann, “Trump 
says US will develop space-based missile defense,” 
Associated Press News, January 17, 2019 <https://
www.apnews.com/33e12cf640a6408bb11aa3de
fa864966> (accessed on March 11, 2019).
DGAPkompakt  / Nr. 4 / March 2019
The opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP). 
Editing  Eva-Maria McCormack,  
Hanna Bianca Krebs
Layout  Reiner Quirin
Design Concept  Carolyn Steinbeck · Gestaltung  
Publisher   DGAP e.V.
ISSN 1611-7034 
Rauchstraße 17 / 18  .  10787 Berlin
Tel. +49 (0)30 25 42 31 -0 / Fax -16
info@dgap.org  .  www.dgap.org
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung – Nicht kommerziell – Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International Lizenz.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Hypersonic Weapon Systems Will Decrease Global Strategic Stability – and Current Control Regimes Won’t Do  6
